Regulation of Recombinant DNA Research: A Comparative Study by Teichmann, David L.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1983
Regulation of Recombinant DNA Research: A
Comparative Study
David L. Teichmann
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David L. Teichmann, Regulation of Recombinant DNA Research: A Comparative Study, 6 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (1983).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol6/iss1/1
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 6 1983 NUMBER I
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DAVID L. TEICHMANN*
"Nature is often hidden, sometimes
overcome, seldom extinguished."
-Francis Bacon (16th Century)
I. INTRODUCTION
Although recombinant DNA's effect on the future of mankind
is unpredictable, its impact is certain to be monumental. Hailed by
many as "a genie capable of transforming the world,"' others fear
this new revolutionary technique may create Andromeda strains ca-
pable of destroying the human species.2 Genetic manipulation3 could
* B.A., 1977, Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut; M.A.L.D., 1980, Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy; J.D., 1982, University of Hawaii School of Law; Associate,
Fenwick. Stone, Davis & West, Los Angeles, California.
i. Golden, Shaping Life in the Lab, TIME, Mar. 9, 1981, at 50. This genie-like
characteristic has caused gene splicing to be viewed as "a new alchemy that may one day
turn the basest of creatures into genetic gold." Id.
2. Zilinskas, Recombinant DNA Research and the International System, 51 CAL. L.
REV. 1483 (1978). Zilinskas notes three broad categories under which such a situation might
arise:
(1) a life form with known detrimental properties might escape from a laboratory
and enter the biosphere . . . (2) a life form, after being developed and used for
a positive quality might manifest unplanned, detrimental side effects; or (3) life
forms may be deliberately designed and developed for use in warfare, international
terrorism, or blackmail.
Id. at 1483-84.
3. The terms-recombinant DNA, genetic manipulation and genetic engineering-
will be used somewhat interchangeably in this article. What is being referred to is the
process whereby the genetic material, containing hereditary instructions, is removed from a
DNA molecule, and inserted into a host organism. This recombination may not occur in
nature, which is why it is so revolutionary. The end result is that the host organism begins
to take on the additional characteristics of the spliced DNA molecule, since the inserted
material is replicated in the bacterium. For a detailed discussion of the structural aspects
of DNA, see J. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1968).
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be to the 1980's what microcomputers were to the 1970's. 4 Possible
uses are numerous and diverse, including the production of interferon,
human insulin, human growth hormone, enzymes for food and animal
feed, flavor and perfume additives, pesticides, lubricants, fertilizers
to promote nitrogen-fixing in plants, and bacteria to convert coal into
gas.' All nations must be concerned with biotechnology because of
its ability to alter genetic structures, industrial processes, and possibly
environmental balances. Regulatory schemes must be fashioned to
anticipate, not merely react to, problems and complications which
will arise as this new technology matures. Without a concerted and
preventive approach by international groups, the world may discover
that it has opened Pandora's box rather than rubbed Aladdin's lamp.
There are several countries which have formulated genetic en-
gineering research guidelines. 6 Others rely on existing legislation
which regulates related areas such as health-and-safety-at-work, the
environment, and use of medical pharmaceutical products. 7 Although
the biotechnologists themselves sounded the initial alert to the poten-
tial dangers of genetic manipulation,' many of these scientists now
acknowledge that the original fears about DNA research were some-
what exaggerated. 9 This re-evaluation of the potential dangers of
genetic engineering could result in a more relaxed attitude in many
countries toward the necessity for regulation of scientific research.
This article provides an insight into the present status of the
debate by analyzing the attitudes of nations which have established
guidelines and/or legislation in this area. This article will also con-
sider the feasibility of international cooperation in this field and iden-
tify current institutions, agreements and treaties. Finally, the strength
4. Golden, supra note I, at 51.
5. Where Genetic Engineering Will Change Industr_, Bus. WK., Oct. 22, 1979, at
160, 172. In fact, expectations are that DNA may eventually "produce vaccines against
hepatitis and malaria; miracle products like low calorie sugar; hardy self-fertilizing food
crops that could usher in a new 'green revolution'; fuels, plastics and other industrial chem-
icals, out of civilization's wastes; mining and refining processes to relieve Malthusian anx-
ieties about a future without sufficient raw materials." Golden, supra note i, at 50.
6. Cripps, A New Frontier for International Law, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. I & n.4
(1980).
7. Id. See also infra notes 17-97 and accompanying text.
8. Letter from Paul Berg, Chairman of the Committee on Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules, to the Editor (June 1974) (warning of potential hazards of recombinant DNA mole-
cules), reprinted in 71 PRoc. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 2593, 2593-94 (1974). See also infra notes
11-16 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 1, at 59.
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of the newly emerging genetic engineering industry 0 and its probable
influence on the course of this debate are evaluated.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENETIC ENGINEERING
Although scientists have engaged in genetic research for decades,
the development of new genetic engineering technologies began to
make significant headway only in the late 1970's. Similar to the
growth of computer technology, genetic engineering technology has
advanced in quantum leaps. One scientist noted that approximately
ninety-five percent of the projects on which his firm is working were
not even conceived of two years ago. "
Stanford biochemist Paul Berg was the first scientist to question
seriously the sufficiency of existing safeguards when he began to
insert simian virus (SV40) genes into the bacterium Escherichia coli
(E. coli), an organism normally found in the human intes-
tine. Because of the uncertainty of what might ensue should the
bacterium escape his laboratory, Berg voluntarily postponed his ex-
periment. What followed led to numerous regulations and guidelines
aimed at alleviating Berg's worst fears.
In 1974, a group of eleven scientists working in the genetic
engineering field formed the National Academy of Sciences' Com-
mittee on Recombinant DNA Molecules and issued a warning to their
peers patterned after Berg's concerns. Because of the Committee's
efforts, many geneticists throughout the world have agreed that certain
"high risk" genetic experiments should not be undertaken in the
presently available facilities. 12 A significant result of the moratorium
was the sponsorship of various conferences to discuss the potential
hazards and ethical issues involved in genetic engineering re-
search. Perhaps the most important meeting was the Asilomar Con-
ference in 1973. This gathering of scientists issued recommendations
to increase safety and decrease the risk of strange life forms escaping
10. Virtually nothinghas been commercially marketed as a result of these discover-
ies. However, massive expenditures and investments have already been made in anticipation
of what lies ahead. See infra notes 171-202 and accompanying text.
11. Where Genetic Engineering Will Change Industry, supra note 5, at 172.
12. Berg, Baltimore, Brenner, Roblin & Singer, Summary Statement of the Asilomar
Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 72 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI., U.S.A. 1981
(1975), reprinted in Genetic Engineering, Human Genetics, and Cell Biology: Evolution
of Technological Issues: DNA Recombinant Research (Supplemental Report Ii): Report
Prepared for the Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Technology of the House Comm. on
Science and Technology, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Supplemental
Report 11].
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from laboratories. National guidelines controlling genetic manipu-
lation embodied many of these recommendations. 3
Various efforts were made in the following years to develop and
gather evidence relating to these early concerns about recombinant
DNA. Most reports showed that certain strains of host 14 organisms
had high safety ratings, particularly when inserted with specific
plasmids 5 under special laboratory conditions. Some of the DNA
recombinations were found to be no different than those naturally
occurring in the atmosphere. 16
The new data, in conjunction with the amazing advances and
promised benefits from the industrial application of these techniques,
led to a softening of criticism of genetic engineering research in some
circles, particularly in the scientific community. Not all voices were
silenced, however, as many people became aware of the potentially
negative impact of genetic manipulation on public health, the envi-
ronment and the evolutionary process.
13. Over 100 top scientists met at Asilomar in Pacific Grove, California, to come to
grips with this issue. Among the participants were James Watson. renowned for his decoding
of DNA in the 1950's, and David Baltimore, a recent Nobel prize winner in the field. First,
the group wanted the National Institute of Health (NIH), a source of most funding for work
in this area, to formulate guidelines for future research activities. This major change in
policy (outside control of scientific research was previously without precedent) was not as
earth-shaking as the second request. Also sought was a complete worldwide moratorium
until the potential hazards of recombinant research could be identified and addressed. The
NIH's efforts which followed set the tone for much of the national activity by other coun-
tries. See Mays, Tempest in a Test Tube, STUDENT LAW., Mar. 1981, at 26, 28.
14. The "host" is the cell into which the recombinant molecule is introduced in order
to determine how it will function or reproduce. Normally a microorganism, the host chosen,
is one about which a great deal of genetic information is already known. The organism
selected most frequently is Escherichia coli (E. coli), a common inhabitant of the human
intestine. The non-pathogenic strain K-12 is the preferred host since it will not produce
infections in the blood stream, a precautionary consideration in the event it escapes from
the laboratory. See Supplemental Report II, supra note 12, at 9.
15. Plasmids are structures found in bacteria which contain DNA but, being smaller
units, are more susceptible to manipulation. Capable of self-replication, these plasmids are
extracted from the bacteria and reconstructed with different DNA materials. They are in-
serted into a host cell to complete the genetic engineering function. Much is still unknown
about the behavior of plasmids in higher forms of organisms. See id. at 10-1I.
16. This was used as a justification for continuing the work on recombinant DNA
absent restrictions. The argument is weak, however, since the value of recombinant DNA
emanates from the fact that it makes possible combinations which do not occur natu-
rally. This has many people worried about the long-range potential to alter the evolutionary
pattern of some classes of organisms, especially humans. See generally Rifkin, Who Should
Play God?, reprinted in Recombinant DNA Regulation Act. 1977. Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 301 (1977).
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III. NATIONAL REGULATORY RESPONSES
Not all nations have been actively involved in this debate because
they do not currently sponsor genetic engineering research. It will
be useful at this point, however, to examine the various ways in which
some nations have responded to this dilemma, e.g., how their ap-
proaches have reflected a balancing of the uncertain risks and benefits
generated by genetic engineering research.
A. United States
Reacting to the concerns expressed at Asilomar and in many
parts of the country, the NIH in 1976 promulgated "Guidelines for
Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules." These guide-
lines, drafted by the Recombinant DNA Molecule Program Advisory
Committee (RAC), applied to all NIH-funded genetic manipulation
research. 17 Prohibition of certain experiments and prescription of spe-
cial procedures for other experiments were achieved through
categorization of experiments by risk levels. ' 8 To prevent dangerous
accidents, the guidelines sought to use physical' 9 and biological
17. Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976). These
guidelines have been revised several times. The most current version was approved in
November, 1980. On the issue of compliance, see Korwek, The NIH Guidelines for Re-
combinant DNA Research and the Authority of FDA to Require Compliance with the Guide-
lines, 35 FOOD & DRUG CosM. L.J. 633 (1980).
18. This categorization has changed over time. Section I-D of the November, 1980
Guidelines prohibits those experiments which involve the formation of recombinant DNAs
derived from various pathogenic organisms (listed in the annex to the guidelines), formation
of recombinant DNAs containing genes for the biosynthesis of toxins potent for vertebrates,
deliberate release into the environment of any organism containing recombinant DNA. de-
liberate transfer of drug resistance trait to microorganisms not known to acquire it naturally
(if such acquisition could compromise the use of a drug to control disease agents in human
or veterinary medicine or agriculture), and large-scale experiments (more than 10 liters of
culture) containing recombinant DNAs. Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant
DNA Molecules, 45 Fed. Reg. 77,384 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 NIH Guidelines].
19. These physical containment procedures, equipment, and laboratory installations.
provide physical barriers, applied in varying degrees according to the relative anticipated
biohazard. The objective is to "confine organisms containing recombinant DNA molecules
and thus to reduce the potential for exposure of the laboratory worker, persons outside the
laboratory, and the environment to organisms containing recombinant DNA molecules." Id.
at 77,386 (§ 11-B). Four levels of physical containment (PI, P2. P3 and P4) can be achieved
by using different combinations of laboratory practices, containment equipment, and special
laboratory design. These levels are based on existing containment approaches used by the
Center for Disease Control and the National Cancer Institute. Id.
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containment ° in various combinations. While federal agencies
adopted these guidelines as their working standards, private industry
was not legally bound by the guidelines. 21  Nonetheless, the few pri-
vate firms working with genetic manipulation have in large part ad-
hered to the NIH Guidelines .22
Public debate over the merits of genetic engineering research and
the sufficiency of the NIH scheme led to the establishment of guide-
lines at the community level in various states. 23  This public out-
pouring of concern did not prevent the NIH, however, from softening
its tone in subsequent revisions of the Guidelines in 1978 and
1980.24 Countless hearings were held by Congress, state legislatures,
city councils and universities. Some of the most vocal participation
took place during the Berkeley and Cambridge discus-
sions. 25 Eventually, both Harvard and the University of California at
20. Highly specific biological barriers are to be utilized to limit both the infectivity
of a vector (plasmid or virus) for specific hosts and its dissemination and survival in the
environment. HV levels (Host/Vector) are established, to which specific criteria apply. A
further distinction is drawn between prokaryotes and eukaryotes, each designating different
complexities of organisms used as hosts. Combinations of host and vector are chosen to
minimize the following types of escape: (1) survival of the vector and its host outside the
laboratory, and (2) transmission of the vector from the propagation host to other nonlaboratory
hosts. Id. at 77,390 (§ 11-D-2).
21. The Guidelines apply to all recombinant DNA research done within the United
States or its territories which is sponsored by an institution that receives support for recom-
binant DNA research from the NIH. The Guidelines also apply to research done abroad if
supported by NIH funds, unless the host country has established rules for recombinant DNA
projects. In such a case, the NIH may waive compliance with the Guidelines. Id. at 77,398
(§ IV-B). In all other cases, compliance with the Guidelines, while encouraged, is merely
voluntary. Id. at 77,404 (§ VI-A).
22. See Recombinant DNA Research and its Applications: Oversight Report by the
Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Oversight
Report].
23. Id. at 31.
24. This softening in tone effectively lifted restrictions on one-third of recombiiant
DNA work. The system still requires establishment of institutional biohazard committees
and registration of projects, but the risk-assessment experiments performed after 1976 have
led to decreased concern about certain classes of organisms. This is evidenced by the
Exemptions list in the current Guidelines edition. See 1980 NIH Guidelines, supra note 18,
at 77,385 (§ I-E).
25. In response to Harvard University's announcement that a new research facility
was to be constructed for biological work, the Boston Phoenix published an article detailing
the worst possible scenario involving escaped organisms spreading through Cambridge. This
helped initiate a mass meeting on June 23, 1976, in conjunction with the city council meeting,
attended by over 400 individuals. Testimony tended to condemn the NIH Guidelines (co-
incidentally released that day) as being too lenient for use in Cambridge. A moratorium on
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Berkeley adopted even stricter standards than those of the NIH. Other
universities followed suit, including Princeton and Amherst.2 6
A variety of legislation has been introduced in Congress ad-
dressing the biogenetic manipulation issue, but no bills have yet been
passed. 27 During the most active legislative phase, the First Session
of the 95th Congress, from January through December, 1977, sixteen
recombinant DNA bills were placed in the mill.28 Active lobbying
by pharmaceutical manufacturers, scientists concerned about the po-
tential loss of the United States' scientific edge, and patent lawyers
anxious to capitalize on the United States Supreme Court decision
allowing life forms to be patented,29 contributed to the fact that no
legislation resulted. Some legislators believed that it was possible to
regulate potential recombinant DNA problems under existing legis-
lation in related areas, at least until additional information was known
about the technology and its genuine risks. 30 The statutes most fre-
quently referred to in this context are the Public Health Service Act,3
the Toxic Substances Control Act,3 2 the Occupational Safety and Health
Act,33 the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 34 various Depart-
ment of Agriculture quarantine laws,35 and the Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act. 36
However, none of the existing statutes deal with the unique
characteristics of the recombinant DNA situation. The regulatory
recombinant DNA work was agreed to until new guidelines, acceptable to the city, were
established. This was completed by the end of the year. Mays, supra note 13, at 28. See
also Krimsky, A Comparative View of State and Municipal Laws Regulating the Use of
Recombinant DNA Molecules Technology, RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL., Nov.
1979, at 121.
26. Mays, supra note 13, at 51.
27. Id. Between 1977 and 1981, fifteen bills were introduced in Congress. Id.
28. For a recapitulation of the bills introduced during the Ninety-fifth Congress, see
Hernandez, Summary of Federal Recombinant DNA Legislation, 95th Congress First Session,
RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL., Nov. 1978, at 15.
29. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See infra note 192 for a detailed
discussion of this case.
30. See generally Oversight Report, supra note 22.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1978).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 831-836 (1979).
35. 21 U.S.C. §§ Ill, 114, 114(b), 123, 134(a) (1972).
36. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-364 (1972).
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statutes3 7 are not designed to prevent environmental damage or to
eliminate health hazards of which little is known. Neither the pre-
market testing statutes 38 nor the pollution control statutes 9 offer sat-
isfactory aid because knowledge of the hazards is incomplete. The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)40 is the only statute which
can be utilized in spite of this information vacuum, 41 since it requires
environmental impact statements (EISs) regardless of the industry's
state of knowledge in an area. In sum, the existing statutory schemes
do not add up to a stalwart preventive program. The key issues not
addressed by existing statutes include licensing, mandatory disclosure
of research, public participation in all phases of regulation, and es-
tablishment of civil liability for institutions whose activities lead to
injury of individuals exposed to genetically manipulated organisms.42
Currently there is no great hope for passing any comprehensive
legislation controlling recombinant DNA research and manufacturer
use. Rather, as the genetic engineering firms grow and biotechnology
37. These regulatory statutes include the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Occu-
pational Safety Health Act, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and the Public Health Services
Act. Oversight Report, supra note 22, at 94.
38. The pre-market testing statutes include, inter alia, the Toxic Substances Control
Act and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Id.
39. The Occupational Safety and Health Act is one of the pollution control statutes. Id.
40. 42 US.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
4 1. Oversight Report, supra note 22, at 94. The reason for this is that NEPA requires
federal agencies to evaluate environmental impacts regardless of information gaps. Id.
42. Id. at 95. Eight goals were promulgated by the National Resources Defense
Council as necessary for an effective regulatory program. This program must:
1. Apply uniformly to all persons and institutions engaged in recombinant
activities.
2. Prevent release of organisms, rather than control emissions or remedy
environmental damage after it has occurred. A preventive program is essential,
because the consequences of recombinant technology are largely unknown, but
likely to be irreversible. Licensing which requires containment facilities and reg-
ulates work practices is the most effective form of preventive legislation.
3. Protect the environment as well as human health.
4. Provide continuing evaluation of risks as more information becomes
available.
5. Provide technology assessment of proposed uses of recombinant tech-
niques and organisms.
6. Provide public participation in all phases of regulation.
7. Require full disclosure of all recombinant DNA research, development,
manufacturing and use.
8. Establish civil liability of institutions engaged in recombinant DNA ac-
tivities, for injury to individuals exposed to recombinant DNA organisms.
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stocks continue to soar on Wall Street, 43 the prospects for national
regulation are dim. Even though the recipients of NIH grants are still
subject to a series of guidelines, private industry seems to have sub-
stantial freedom with which to conduct research. In fact, increased
ties between private industry and universities are likely to result from
attempts to avoid some of these restrictions. This is also an oppor-
tunity for universities to capitalize on the patent rush, in spite of
academic fears that the integrity of pure research may be
compromised. 44
B. United Kingdom
Since the discussion of potential dangers of genetic engineering
began, Great Britain has been a leader in exploring means of con-
trolling and regulating the field. Great Britain's Ashby Working Party4 5
and Williams Working Party46 each produced data demonstrating the
need for genetic engineering research to continue, but under carefully
prescribed conditions. In addition to the Ashby Report of January
1975 and the Williams Report of 1976, the U.K. Health and Safety
Commission (HSC) published draft regulations. These regulations
conflicted philosophically and pragmatically with the two
43. See Golden, supra note 1, at 51-52.
44. This is the most controversial part of the debate. On the one hand, various people
fear the inter-mixture of professor's duties and "moonlighting" for genetic engineering firms
on the grounds that it will lead to compromises of integrity. The exchange of ideas and
research among colleagues would dry up under this scenario, as researchers would want to
protect potentially patentable, gold-laden ideas. On the other hand, many argue that com-
mercialization in biology is past due. Commercialization of the chemicals industry has
already been in effect for many years. The feeling of these advocates is that "[bly treating
biology as a sophisticated form of chemistry, the new techniques of manipulating genes are
no more sacred and no less commercial than, say, the alloying of new metals or the production
of new drugs." Mays, supra note 13, at 53. See also A Firm, No: Research vs. Profit at
Harvard, TIME, Dec. I, 1980, at 59.
45. Established by the Advisory Board for the Research Council in July, 1974, to
assess the hazards and benefits of genetic engineering research, the Ashby Working Party
concluded that, subject to stringent safety precautions, such work should continue and be
encouraged. It suggested the formation of a national group to propound research principles
and oversee research efforts. First Report of the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group
(U.K.), reprinted in RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL., June 1978, at 16-17.
46. On the basis of the Ashby Report's recommendations, another group, the Williams
Working Party, was established in 1975. Its purpose was primarily to formulate guide-
lines. This study recommended that a genetic manipulation advisory body be commissioned.
comprised of scientists and members of the public at large. The report also established four
groups of experiments to be conducted under varying degrees of containment. Each institute
which would conduct research was to have a biological safety officer and biohazard
committee. Id.
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reports .47 Present regulations are slanted in favor of the Williams
Report.
In response to the Williams Report, the Genetic Manipulation
Advisory Group (GMAG) was formed in 1976, its principal duties
being the review of genetic research proposals and the suggestion of
safety precautions and laboratory procedures .48 Unlike the United
States' RAC, GMAG is structured to represent a broad range of
interests in society, with members from the trade unions, scientific
community, business community, universities, health services, and
the public. 49 The need for consensus ensures that no single member
can impose its views on the others.
GMAG makes recommendations as a technical advisory board,
whereas HSC has authority to inspect university, industry and gov-
ernmental laboratories. GMAG's legal bite derives, therefore, from
HSC's administrative shield over the Health and Safety at Work
Act.50 In addition, GMAG's regulations apply to private industry as
well as to public research, which pleases the public, but not industry.
As a result of GMAG's review of proposed industrial projects
involving recombinant DNA, serious concerns over the possible loss
of confidentiality exist among industrial cliques. The solution adopted
to avoid compromising commercial secrecy is to ask all members of
GMAG, some of whom either work for, or are consultants to, com-
panies other than the one whose proposal might be under consid-
eration, to voluntarily sign a confidentiality agreement.5' Companies
which have not signed the agreement, as well as those connected with
the proposal in any way, do not participate in the deliberations. In
47. Zilinskas, supra note 2, at 1487.
48. Id. at 1487-88.
49. In the establishment of the Group, the advice of the Trades Union Congress
(TUC), the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Committee of Vice-
Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) was sought; the Group's membership now
comprises 8 appointed as scientific and medical experts, 5-including our Chair-
man-able to represent the interests of employees, 4 nominated by the TUC to
represent the interests of employees, and 2 (one nominated by the CBI, the other
by the CVCP) to represent the interests of management.
First Report of the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group (U.K.), supra note 45, at 17. See
also Wolstenholme, British Solution to Genetic Engineering, 81 NEW SCIENTIST 1037 (1979).
50. Report of the Sub-committee on Genetic Manipulation (Recombinant DNA Re-
search, Application, and Regulation) [of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the North
Atlantic Assembly] in UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY, HELD AT OTTAWA, CANADA, OCTOBER 22 TO OCTOBER 27,
1979, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION 206TH (Comm. Print 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Report of the Sub-committee on Genetic Manipulation].
51. GMAG Secrecy Worries MPs, 81 NEW SCIENTIST 236 (1979).
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general, this system has been relatively successful. The principal
problem is that the committee is often left without experts when large
numbers withdraw for fear of potential conflicts.5 2 This frequently
occurs since most members intend to communicate whatever they
learn during the deliberations to their constituents.5 3
Although the First Report of GMAG, issued in May 1978, clas-
sified research proposals according to the organisms involved,5 4 the
approach of the group in 1979 was to adopt a "risk-assessment"
system, taking into account the nature of the gene itself, rather than
merely its source.5 5 In this manner, experimentation with genes known
to have pathogenic capacity in plants could be more highly restricted
than harmless genes extracted from animals. 56 This approach would
work only if previous research on the gene had been undertaken, i.e.,
how the genes behave in the test tube.
t During late 1978 and early 1979, increasing reassessments of
the GMAG structure were made. Particular questions arose as to why
GMAG was not overseen by the Department of Health and Social
Security (DHSS), but by the Department of Education and Sci-
ence. 57 This concern over who should be regulating these activities
is analogous to that present in the United States. The approach thus
far has been for DHSS to take only a passing interest until the new
products of genetic engineering arrive, or until the release of a ge-
netically manipulated organism into the environment creates a disease
or other disaster. 58
The role of local safety or biohazard committees in the United
Kingdom is significant. The Williams Working Party's report rec-
ommended that there be a safety committee at each institute where
genetic research is being carried out. Moreover, GMAG has input
into the composition of these local biolbazard committees. 59 GMAG
52. Select Committee Questions GMAG's Membership, 81 NEW SCIENTIsT 845 (1979).
53. Id.
54. Lewin, New Guidelines for Britain's Genetic Engineers, 81 NEW SCIENTIST 459
(1979).
55. Id.
56. Id. This sentiment and approach is reflected in the NIH Guidelines to an ex-
tent. See 1980 NIH Guidelines, supra note 18, at 77,384-85 (§§ I-D & l-E).
57. A Cat's Cradle of Control for Genetic Manipulation, 81 NEw SCIENTIST 557
(1979).
58. Id. This is also analogous to the attitude of U.S. agencies, many of which, rather
than taking a preventive stance, prefer to postpone regulation until firms attempt to market
genetically engineered products.
59. Report of the Sub-committee on Genetic Manipulation, supra note 50, at 206.
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limits itself to safety considerations, while leaving to local committees
the responsibilities of evaluating the ethical and scientific merits of
proposals. 6°
However, even local committees began to feel the weight of top-
level pressures to ease controls-pressures which were reflected in
official policy statements by the House of Commons Select Committee
on Science and Technology. 6' The tone of the report issued by this
committee was one of concern lest stringent controls drive British
researchers overseas and place indigenous scientists at a comparative
disadvantage vis-i-vis foreign researchers. 62
An offshoot of this concern was the outpouring of suggestions
from various research councils that the government not only ease
controls, but also support genetic research. The Advisory Council
for Applied Research and Development (ACARD), the Royal Society,
and the Advisory Board for the Research Councils (ABRC) isgued a
joint report imploring the government to ensure that some £10 million
be spent from 1980 to 1985 on biotechnology research. Under the
guidance of a Joint Committee for Biotechnology, the effort would
seek to capture key industrial opportunities in the field. 63 The report
also recommended establishing a national biotechnology firm similar
to Genetech or Cetus, two private United States firms. 64
Since the review of safety procedures in recent years is of less
importance, GMAG's role is expected to change. Its members have
suggested it give its expert attention to new issues such as pollution 65
and ethics66 while remaining attentive to potential hazards if new
research techniques develop. 67 In effect, GMAG is undergoing a face
60. GMAG Debates New Controls on Genetic Engineering, 81 NEW SCIENTIST 4
(1979).
61. Lewin, Genetic Engineering Under the Parliamentar" Microscope, 83 NEW
SCIENTIST 430 (1979).
62. Id. A perfect example stems from the fact that interferon, although discovered
in the United Kingdom, is being geared up for commercial production in the United States
and Switzerland. See infra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
63. Yanchinski, Engineering the Future of Biotechnology, 86 NEW SCIENTIST 3 (1980).
64. Id. See also infra notes 171-202 and accompanying text.
65. Genetic Engineering: Watchdog Lives to Bie Again, 89 NEW SCIENTIST 7 (1981). It
has been suggested that particular emphasis should be placed on examination of the effects
of genetically engineered pesticides and new plants or viruses that digest oil spills. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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lift. What form it ultimately takes also depends, in part, on the future
effect of pressure exerted from the European Economic Community. 68
C. Other OECD Nations' Approaches
Countries other than the United States and the United Kingdom
which have established guidelines or considered legislation to regulate
recombinant DNA research have adopted standards similar to those
of the NIH or GMAG. Hence, no attempt shall be made to provide
a detailed presentation of each country. Rather, brief descriptions of
each will emphasize major differences and similarities.
1. Federal Republic of Germany
Voluntary guidelines were promulgated by the Federal Republic
of Germany in mid-February, 1978.69 Similar to the United States'
guidelines, the German structure separates experiments according
to risk factors, and outlines necessary physical and biological con-
tainment procedures. Overseeing the program is the Zentrale
Kommission ftir die Biologische Sicherheit (ZKBS), 70 which is ap-
pointed by the Federal Minister for Research and Technology, in
conjunction with several other ministers.7 Each research body must
have a project safety officer and a project leader. ZKBS is to assist
each institution in appointing project coordinators and establishing
containment procedures. Similar to GMAG and RAC, ZKBS's twelve
members are to be drawn from a representative cross-section of
German society. 72 Finally, the guidelines place great emphasis on
monitoring the health of individuals engaged in genetic research.
73
68. See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
69. Guidelines for the Safe Handling of Recombinant Nucleic Acid (DNA) for the
Federal Republic of Germany (approved by the Federal Cabinet in February, 1978), translated
in RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL., Mar. 1978, at II [hereinafter cited as Federal
Republic of Germany DNA Guidelines].
70. Id. at 16.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 17. Membership is based on:
(a) four experts working in the field of recombinant DNA research,
(b) four experts who, though not working in the field of recombinant DNA
research, possess specific knowledge in the implementation of safety measures
in biologic research work, particularly however in microbiology, cytobiology
or hygiene, and in addition.
(c) four outstanding individuals, for example from the trade unions, industry and
the research-promoting organization.
Id.
73. Id. Genetic manipulation laboratory staff members must undergo a series of
checkups and blood tests. The serum from the blood tests is to be retained for at least two
years from the end of employment. This would allow development of an extensive data
base as well as reflect a concern for the immediate health of the worker. Id.
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2. France
France's effort to regulate recombinant DNA research began in
1975, with the founding of the Ethical Review Group and Control
Commission-two sub-groups of the D616gation G6n6rale de la
Recherche Scientifique et Technique (DGRST).7 4 Adopted in 1977,
the French guidelines are less stringent than many others in recognition
of the perhaps conjectural hazards of DNA research. No effort to
impose a statutory scheme over genetic manipulation research is pres-
ently anticipated. 75 Rather, the government is sponsoring diverse
French industrial efforts, going so far as to set up the Groupe Genie
Genetique, a specialized biotechnology firm .76 In fact, official French
comments indicate that biotechnology may receive the same special
treatment already accorded the nuclear, space and information-pro-
cessing industries, thus limiting the likelihood of strict controls.
77
3. Canada
In Canada, the Medical Research Council guidelines were revised
in December, 1978. These new guidelines are based on the revised
NIH guidelines.78  However, viruses are treated separately, and are
assigned their own containment procedures. In addition, biological
containment is preferred over physical containment in the Canadian
scheme. 79 Further regulation of recombinant DNA activity is made
possible under existing laws of the Health Protection Branch, whose
powers include inspection of laboratories.80 Thus far, the guidelines
have been applied flexibly.
4. The Netherlands
Research regulation in the Netherlands has been under the control
of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, a body
74. Report of the Sub-committee on Genetic Manipulation, supra note 50, at 208.
75. Id.
76. Challenging the U.S. Lead in Biotechnology, Bus. WK., Aug. 4, 1980, at 30.
77. Lloyd, French Come to Grips with Biotechnology, 84 NEW ScIEsnTST 677 (1979). A
report requested by former President Valdry Giscard D'Estaing warns of the "risk to science's
reputation as biology creates more and more opportunities for industrial activity under the
guise of medical research." Id. The report also predicts that 30,000 jobs should develop
over the next ten years in the biotechnology field in France. Id.
78. Report of the Sub-committee on Genetic Manipulation, supra note 50, at 207.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 208.
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which favors legislation in conjunction with guidelines. 8' Despite its
initial failure to include members of the public on its committee, the
Dutch government has maintained a precautionary stance. But the
revised guidelines have dropped some of the prohibited experiments
from the NIH-patterned early guidelines. The deliberate introduction
of any recombinant DNA material into the environment for testing
purposes is still prohibited. All genetic manipulation experiments
must be registered. 2
5. Italy
An Italian group-the Society of Biophysics and Molecular Bi-
ologists-was patterned after Asilomar to study the implications of
genetic research and the need for legislative responses.83 A Ministry
of Health advisory group recommended that a permanent committee
be formed to analyze publicly funded research. Approval to continue
work would then be granted or denied within three months of the
application for consideration. While industry would not be bound by
this scheme, effective regulation was virtually assured in the private
sector by denying patents on those commercial products which might
result from non-approved experiments. 84
6. Norway
As late as 1979, there was very little recombinant DNA work
being done in Norway. Thus, it is understandable that no special
legislation has been passed. The existing Environment-at-Work laws
are felt to be sufficient. Additionally, the Central Public Health Lab-
oratory for Infectious Diseases operates with the National Committee
on Recombinant DNA to screen all government-funded pro-
jects. Industry compliance is on a voluntary basis.8 5
7. Other European Countries
In both Belgium and Sweden, virtually no legislative attention
has been paid to the genetic manipulation field. In Belgium, a
81. Cripps, supra note 6, at I & n.4 (citing Report of the Committee in Charge of
the Control on Genetic Manipulation, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences,
Mar. 1977).
82. Report of the Sub-committee on Genetic Manipulation, supra note 50, at 209-10.
83. Note, Genetic Manipulation: Research Regulation and Legal Liability Under
International Law, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203, 214 n.54 (1977).
84. Report of the Sub-committee on Genetic Manipulation, supra note 50, at 209.
85. Id. at 210.
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sub-committee on recombinant DNA research, established by the Na-
tional Foundation for Medical Research and the Committee for Med-
ical Ethics, concluded that existing laws concerning work hazards
provide adequate protection.86 In Sweden, the only activity in the
area has been the creation of a general toxicity committee by the
Swedish Medical Research Council to study the implications of genetic
research. 87
8. Japan
Japan, a highly competitive country in complex technology in-
dustries, has yet to make significant inroads into biotechnology.
Nevertheless, movement in this direction has been facilitated recently
by the awarding of funds to private industry by the government's
Research Development Corporation of Japan. 88 It is likely that the
Japan Science Council guidelines will ultimately reflect the tone of
the NIH regulations. These guidelines, according to the comments
of the Council in 1977, should be based on the three principles of
"independence," "democracy," and "openness to public scru-
tiny.' '89 If public accountability is as great as it has been in other
environmental contexts, the guidelines may have some teeth. Already
these three principles supposedly guide Japanese atomic energy
research. 9o
D. Non-OECD Nations' Approaches
1. Australia and New Zealand
Australia and New Zealand are involved in the recombinant
DNA debate. New Zealand is considering legislation, 91 while the
Australian Academy of Science (AAS) has passed guidelines for its
microbiologists. 92 The University of Melbourne's interest in this topic
86. Id. at 207.
87. Note, supra note 83, at 214 n.54.
88. Challenging the U.S. Lead In Biotechnology, supra note 76, at 3 1.
89. Science Council of Japan, Statement on the Security of the Recombinant DNA
Research in Japan, translated in RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL., Nov. 1978, at 18.
90. Id. For a comprehensive treatment of the development of environmental and
safety standards in Japan, see L. GRESSER. K. FUJIKARA & A. MORISHIMA. ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW IN JAPAN 252-59 (1981).
91. See Cripps, supra note 6, at I & n.4.
92. Maslen, Genetic Engineering Debate Reaches Australia, 82 NEW SCIENTIST 6
(1979).
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has led to the formation of a special committee, comprised of a
philosopher, a lawyer, a zoologist, an environmental designer and a
biophysicist. This committee called for mandatory application of the
AAS guidelines, establishment of a regulatory body, certification of
institutions as suitable for carrying on genetic manipulation research,
and development of legislation. 93 Despite the fact that voluntary com-
pliance eventually breaks down, these recommendations for a man-
datory scheme are likely to be dismissed, as they already have been
by many Australian recombinant DNA researchers. 94
2. Soviet Union
At the time of the Asilomar meeting, Soviet authorities had not
established any official criteria for genetic manipulation re-
search. The Soviet Ministry of Health stated that there were no re-
strictions on basic or applied DNA-related work. 95 Nevertheless, after
the conference, provisional guidelines were issued. Drafted by the
Recombinant DNA Commission at the Interagency Council on Sci-
entific and Technical Problems of Molecular Biology and Molecular
Genetics, these guidelines are compulsory for all Soviet activities in
genetic engineering. 96 The distinction between publicly funded and
private research, common to the countries considered above, is mean-
ingless in the USSR since there is no truly private industry. The basic
parameters of the guidelines are quite similar to the NIH pattern,
although provisions have been inserted which make persons guilty of
violations "legally answerable." 97 Neither the NIH nor the GMAG
rules stipulate any particular liability, but rely on the sanction of
cutting off funds for research to encourage compliance with the
regulations.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Note, supra note 83, at 214 n.54.
96. Provisional Guidelines on Recombinant DNA Manipulation (Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics), reprinted in RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL., June 1978, at
9. Drafted by the Recombinant DNA Commission, the guidelines were approved by the
State Sanitary Inspector-in-Chief of the Soviet Union and the All-Union Council of Trade
Unions of the USSR. Id.
97. Id. at 10. No further elaboration is given as to what sanctions might attach to
this type of violation.
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IV. THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A. Existing International Bodies
The concern over genetic engineering research, which increased
dramatically after the publication of the Berg Letter, sparked a series
of international scientific conferences. 98 Many existing scientific
bodies undertook to define the problems and propose solutions. New
international and regional groups were created, specifically in re-
sponse to the recombinant DNA debate. The most active bodies in
this area have been the European Molecular Biology Organisation
(EMBO), the European Scientific Foundation (ESF), the International
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) and the World Health Organization (WHO).
Primarily interested in disseminating technical information to
genetic engineering research institutes, the EMBO works with the
other scientific unions and has co-sponsored conferences with national
groups. 99 It favors a single international gene pool for genetic en-
gineering activities, as a means of minimizing risks associated with
widespread cloning of materials needed for certain experi-
ments. 00 Since EMBO has ties with the European Molecular Biology
Laboratory (EMBL) in Heidelberg, 10 which operates a special con-
tainment facility that was designed for extremely high risk experi-
ments, this goal could be readily accomplished with maximum safety. 102
Sometimes considered the most active group, ESF promotes new
scientific schemes, enhances communication between scientists, re-
search councils and scholars, and investigates non-scientific aspects
of recombinant DNA issues. 103 The latter purpose is achieved by the
composition of the Working Group on Genetic Manipulation, which
includes scientists, sociologists and lawyers. 104 This group favors the
98. Cripps, supra note 6, at I I & n.64.
99. In addition to work done in association with the sixteen European nations (and
Israel) which sponsor it, EMBO has also conducted risk-assessment experiments at the
Microbiological Research Establishment in England. Id. at II & nn.65-66. See also Reg-
ulation of Recombinant DNA Research: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Science, Tech-
nology and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 427 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on DNA Research].
100. Cripps, supra note 6, at 11.
101. Id. at I In.67.
102. Id. at 11.
103. See id. at 12. See also Zilinskas, supra note 2, at 1488.
104. Cripps, supra note 6, at 12.
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adoption of uniform international regulations, national registration
of experiments and projects, the creation of national biohazard
committees, 0 5 and enforcement structures at the domestic
level.'°6 Generally, the Foundation prefers the GMAG guidelines as
a model for such a uniform system.
International scientific cooperation in the genetic engineering
field is an aim of the European Economic Community (EEC). 07 This
is consistent with that portion of the Treaty of Rome'08 which estab-
lishes the purposes of the group. EEC involvement has been partic-
ularly influential in efforts to bring both private and public research
activities under the roof of a standardized regulatory house-
hold. 09 This harmonization attempt finally led to the issuance of an
EEC Draft Directive calling for stricter controls in gene-splicing re-
search."10 Initial reactions to the Directive were not favorable, par-
ticularly in the United Kingdom where the Lords' Select Committee
on the European Communities felt that the restrictions would inhibit
European research in a highly competitive field and compromise busi-
ness confidentiality by requiring prior authorization from a national
authority before research could begin."'
The most active group on a truly international level is the ICSU,
a body representing eighteen autonomous international scientific unions
and over sixty national academies, research councils and similar in-
stitutions."2 ICSU's involvement in the genetic engineering debate
has been achieved through its Committee on Genetic Experimentation
105. Id. These committees would be designed to have interpretive, advisory and
supervisory responsibilities. Id.
106. Id. The ever-present dilemma, however, is the creation of "teeth" in the en-
forcement structure, such as the development of civil penalties. Id. (citing Recommendations
of the European Science Foundation's Ad Hoc Committee on Genetic Manipulation (adopted
by the ESF Assembly on Oct. 26, 1976)).
107. Cripps, supra note 6. at 12.
108. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3.
109. Cf. Select Committee Slams Directive on Gene Splicing, 86 NEw SCIENTIST 71
(1980) (noting that the European Economic Community has proposed a draft directive on
gene splicing which, if implemented, will have a significant impact on member states).
110. Id. This is particularly significant since the United States has just relaxed its
controls.
I 1. Id. Prior authorization would apply to research, development, use and acqui-
sition of recombinant material. Id.
112. COGENE Reports, reprinted in RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL., Apr.
1979, at 21.
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(COGENE), a special committee formed in October, 1976, and sup-
ported by seven member unions. 3  Established as an interdisciplinary
body, COGENE consists of representatives from various nations"14
and encourages observers from WHO, Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization (FAO), United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Or-
ganization (UNESCO) and United Nations Environmental Program
(UNEP) to attend its meetings. 115 COGENE's working groups-Re-
combinant DNA Guidelines, Training and Education, and Risk As-
sessment--enable it to contribute to the scientific literature on the
state-of-the-art in genetic research and the various implications of
such research. 116 It has sucessfully conducted numerous surveys, one
of which showed that no less than 367 genetic engineering projects
were in progress in 155 laboratories in 15 nations. 117 This report
further indicated the levels of containment being utilized, the number
of countries which had prepared their own guidelines, " I8 and the nature
of these guidelines.' 19 Most have adopted the NIH guidelines, either
wholesale or in large part.
COGENE has spoken out in favor of an international clone
bank. 20 This contrasts with the EMBO's concern over a central bank
for bacteria, plasmids and other recombinant DNA materials. In par-
ticular, the clone bank notion partially reflects COGENE's anxiety
113. Id. These seven unions include: Pure and Applied Chemistry, Biological Sci-
ences, Biochemistry, Pure and Applied Biophysics, Nutritional Sciences, Pharmacology,
and the Immunological Societies. Id.
114. id. at 21-22. These nations include the Soviet Union, the United States, Italy,
Australia, France and West Germany. Id.
115. Cripps, supra note 6, at 13. The purposes of COGENE are:
(a) to review, evaluate and make available information on the practical and
scientific benefits, safeguards, containment facilities and other technical matters,
(b) to consider environmental, health-related and other consequences of any
disposal of biological agents constructed by recombinant DNA techniques,
(c) to foster opportunities for training and international exchange, and
(d) to provide a forum through which interested national, regional. and other
international bodies may communicate.
COGENE Reports, supra note 112, at 21.
116. Hearings on DNA Research, supra note 99, at 426-27.
117. COGENE Reports, supra note 112, at 23.
118. Id. Seventeen nations have drawn up guidelines. Five of these have prepared
their own; the remainder have based their regulations on either the United States' or British
models. Id.
119. Id. Four nations' guidelines are reportedly voluntary: the guidelines of eight are
enforceable through control over research funds: two countries have legally enforceable
standards. Id.
120. Cripps, supra note 6. at 14 & n.81.
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about the founding of plant genetic resource centers and the resultant
trend toward genetic uniformity. COGENE members are concerned
with the technological dependence on a specific feature of a crop that
may result from this decrease in genetic diversity.' 2
COGENE, like other international bodies, has yet to propose a
detailed regulatory scheme for genetic manipulation research. In fact,
at its September, 1980 meeting in Paris, COGENE specifically
reiterated that biological safety "would be a function of WHO and
would not come within the ambit of COGENE.1 1 2 This is one of
the major criticisms of COGENE, despite its many contributions in
other areas of the debate.
Based on these developments, the burden of forming a consensus
on the genetic engineering research question has fallen upon
WHO. As one author has already noted, WHO's involvement has
caused a shift in emphasis "from agreement by the community of
scientists to agreement by the community of states.'
'1 23
Since the 1975 report from its Advisory Committee on Medical
Research (ACMR) recommended the continuation of microbiological
research under appropriate safeguards, WHO has promoted genetic
engineering for its potential contribution to improving medical and
public health. 24 Yet it has been equally concerned that safety reg-
ulations are promulgated, especially with respect to work with infec-
tious materials. 1
25
After co-sponsoring a conference on transportation and transfer
of genetic research materials with the NIH, WHO established an
Advisory Group for Safety Measures in Microbiology (AGSMM). 1
26
Moreover, four working sub-groups were created to coordinate re-
search efforts in special areas: safe transfer of infectious materials,
laboratory safety elements, maximum containment laboratories, and
development of emergency services.'27 The latter sub-group's inter-
national contingency plans were specifically designed to deal with
121. Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of COGENE, reprinted in RECOMBINANT DNA
TECHNICAL BULL., Dec. 1980, at 215-16. COGENE had deferred to the International Board
for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR) on this matter. Id.
122. Id. at 217.
123. Cripps, supra note 6. at 14 (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. Hearings on DNA Research, supra note 99, at 426-27.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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transportation-related accidents. 128
Like COGENE, however, WHO has not promulgated research
guidelines for recombinant DNA work. Nonetheless, WHO is per-
haps in the best position to sponsor an international convention aimed
at adopting uniform research standards.129 This conclusion stems from
the fact that WHO enjoys considerable prestige and possesses a wealth
of experience in health matters affecting the international community,
thus giving it the power base needed to unite diverse nations in support
of a code. WHO may be able to enact an international code via its
implied regulatory power from article 21 of the WHO Constitu-
tion. 130 In article 21, WHO is granted the authority to design regu-
lations in pursuit of sanitation and quarantine goals and any others
necessary to prevent the global spread of disease.'' Preclusion of
biological pollution is impliedly subsumed under this power. Limiting
the feasibility of such an approach, however, is the fact that member
nations are not bound by WHO regulations. By giving notice of a
rejection or a reservation, members can exempt themselves from its
jurisdiction. 13 2
Although the lion's share of the scrutiny over genetic engineering
research at the international level has been undertaken by the bodies
discussed above, several other organizations have been involved as
well. Substantial contributions have been made by the FAO,
UNESCO, the Coalition for Responsible Genetic Research (CRGR),
the Friends of the Earth, the International Association of Micro-
biological Societies (IAMS) and the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization (WIPO). 13 3 In addition, several national bodies, such as
NIH and GMAG, have sponsored international conferences and con-
ducted on-going reviews of international regulatory efforts.
B. Existing Treaties, Conventions and Agreements
Various international agreements have already been formulated
which may be applied to different aspects of the recombinant DNA
128. Cripps, supra note 6, at 14-15.
129. See Note, supra note 83, at 214-15. For a discussion of the feasibility of such
a code, see infra notes 155-70 and accompanying text.
130. Cripps, supra note 6, at 16.
131. Id. (citing Shubber, The Role of WHO in Environmental Pollution Control, 2
EARTH L.J. 363, 372 (1976)).
132. Cripps, supra note 6, at 16 n.94.
133. Many of these contributions have been in the form of conventions or agree-
ments. See infra notes 134-54 and accompanying text.
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research debate. For the most part, these deal with disease prevention
and eradication, pollution, biological warfare, patent protection, li-
ability for accidents and storage of genetic materials. Foremost among
these agreements are the Declaration and Recommendations for Action
formulated at the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment, 13 4 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights,'35 the International Plant Protection Convention, 3 6 the
Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of
Micro-organisms for Purposes of Patent Procedure, 37 the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their De-
struction, 38 the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the At-
mosphere, 13 9 and the OECD Special Program on the Control of Chem-
icals. '40 Thus far, however, they represent only a piecemeal approach
to controlling the production, storage, use and spread of genetically
manipulated organisms. 141
A significant goal of many of these agreements is protection of
the environment. After the Stockholm meeting in 1972, world at-
tention focused on the threat of international pollution. Principle 21
of the Conference on the Human Environment recognized state re-
sponsibility to avoid pollution across national borders; Principle 22
admonished states to further develop international law on liability and
compensation of victims. 142  Although toxic or dangerous substances,
rather than harmful organisms, are singled out for attention, it can be
argued that damage caused by genetic engineering would fall under
the protective umbrella of these precepts. 43
134. Cripps, supra note 6, at 6. The Conference was held in 1972 in Stockholm,
Sweden. See id. at 6 n.41.
135. Id. at 7. In 1980, after being open for signature for fourteen years, it was not
yet ratified. See id. at 7 n.48.
136. Dec. 6, 1951, 150 U.N.T.S. 67, cited in Cripps, supra note 6, at 8 n.52.
137. Opened for signature Apr. 28, 1977, W.I.P.O. Doc. BP/PCD/I of May 31,
1977, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 285 (1978)[hereinafter cited as Budapest Treaty]. See infra
notes 150-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of this treaty.
138. Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 683, cited in Cripps, supra note 6, at 9 n.58.
139. Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, cited in Cripps, supra note 6, at 1 n.l.
140. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): Documents
from the High Level Meeting on Chemicals, May 19-21. 1980, reprinted in 19 1.L.M. 1025
(1980)[hereinafter cited as OECD Chemicals].
141. See Cripps, supra note 6, at 10.
142. Principles 21 and 22 are reprinted in Cripps, supra note 6, at 7.
143. Cripps, supra note 6, at 7.
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This concern over pollution is present at a higher level in the
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere (Test Ban
Treaty). Motivated by political and military reasons, the treaty was
written to prevent fallout of radioactive waste material across national
boundaries.' 44 Genetic materials, under the worst scenario, similar
to radioactive fallout, could also traverse national boundaries if a
surviving host organism escaped the laboratory. Because of the rep-
licative qualities of the bacteria, such an outbreak could be more
dangerous than nuclear fallout. A ban on the release of all recom-
binant DNA organisms into the environment, therefore, is suggested
by the Test Ban Treaty model.
Related to the problem of releasing organisms into the atmosphere
is the problem of restraining biological warfare. Conventions dealing
with biological warfare have repeatedly been construed as precluding
the development of genetically produced organisms as biological
weapons. 
45
A great number of agreements focus on the prevention and control
of disease. By liberally construing the word "disease," genetic en-
gineering-related incidents could fall within the jurisdiction of some
of these agreements, such as the International Agreement for the
Creation at Paris of an International Office of Epizootics' 46 and the
International Plant Protection Convention.
Chemicals are already heavily regulated in the international com-
munity, as evidenced by the OECD High Level Meeting on Chemicals
and the Special Program on the Control of Chemicals. This effort is
quite interesting since the nations involved in the Special Program
agreed on test guidelines, good laboratory practices, the generation
of pre-marketing data, updating mechanisms and mutual acceptance
of data. 47 Additionally, the Special Program supported the future
development of confidentiality of data proposals, promotion of in-
formation exchange and the sponsorship of studies on the economic
and trade aspects of chemical regulation. 48 Billed as "a significant
144. The basis for this statement is a belief that the super powers saw the treaty as a
means of preventing other nations from easily developing nuclear weapons, in particular the
French, whose activities in the South Pacific were controversial throughout the 1960's.
145. Hearings on DNA Research, supra note 99, at 429 (statement of James Malone,
General Counsel of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).
146. Jan. 25, 1924, 26 U.S.T. 1840, cited in Cripps. supra note 6, at 8 & n.49.
147. Bracken, Introductory Note to OECD Documents from the High Level Meeting
on Chemicals, 19 I.L.M. 1023, 1023-24 (1980).
148. Id. at 1024.
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breakthrough in the area of international cooperation for toxic
substances control ,"' 49 the Special Program shows that agreement on
technical procedures and precautionary standards dealing with sci-
entific research and commercialization are both feasible and desirable
at an international level.
Finally, the Budapest Treaty15 0 and its importance to the patenting
of genetically manipulated organisms should be mentioned. An es-
sential purpose of the Treaty is to encourage all member states to
recognize and accept patents granted by one member state. Member
states, which require the deposit of micro-organisms for patent ap-
proval, are requested to recognize deposits made with various inter-
national depositories.'15 Nowhere, however, does the treaty address
the question of what kinds of micro-organisms can be patented. Thus,
it stops short of advocating the patentability of genetically engineered
products. Read in association with the Patent Co-operation Treaty15 2
and the European Patent Convention, ' 53 however, the Budapest Treaty
represents a step toward greater uniformity regarding patent crite-
ria. 54 This development reduces the chance of one nation rejecting
a patent application which another nation has honored.
C. Prospects for a Special Agreement or Code
Despite the existence of scattered treaties, agreements and con-
ventions, truly effective regulation of genetic engineering research
at the international level is not likely to occur in the absence of a
new specialized code or treaty squarely addressing the issues. Yet,
past experience has shown that international conventions are often ill-
suited to deal with rapidly changing technologies, and that the lengthy
and painstakingly slow process of multilateral bargaining is insuffi-
ciently responsive. 55 But these problems have been rendered less
149. Id. See generally Chairman's statement on the need for an international ap-
proach to the systematic control of chemicals, OECD Chemicals, supra note 140, at 1028.
150. Budapest Treaty, opened for signature Apr. 28, 1977, reprinted in 17 I.L.M.
285 (1978). This treaty has been already subscribed to by 18 states. See id. at 285 n.*.
151. Id. art. 3(i)(a), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. at 287.
152. Patent Co-operation Treaty. June 19-Dec. 31, 1977, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
78 (Cmd. 7340) (entered into force Jan. 24, 1978).
153. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1978 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 20 (Cmd. 7090).
154. Cripps, supra note 6. at 8. For a more detailed discussion of the patent situation.
especially in the United States, see infra note 192.
155. Cripps, supra note 6, at 15 (citing Contini & Sand, Methods to Expedite En-
vironmental Protection: International Eco-Standards. 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (1972)).
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troublesome by including special amendment procedures and provi-
sions for on-going technical review by specialized standards com-
mittees in international conventions.
1 56
The striking similarity of the aforementioned national guidelines
57
intimates that international agreement on safety measures for recom-
binant DNA activities would not be difficult to achieve. This effort
would benefit from the work of regional bodies which have already
advocated the adoption of either the NIH or GMAG guidelines.
A quick compromise on the issue of enforcing the guidelines,
on the other hand, would be difficult to achieve. Most nations would
be unwilling to surrender any of their sovereignty, thus reducing the
enforceability of international regulations. Since certain prohibited
activities might need to be curtailed or halted in the event of an
emergency, this is problematic. 1
58
One commentator proposes that an international board of inquiry
be established for the purpose of entertaining complaints from any
signatory state which feels it has been (or will be) injured by another
state's genetic manipulation activities.' 59 The board would suggest
remedial measures. It would enjoin certain activities in the event of
an emergency, and it would update member nations on the state-of-
the-art in genetic research. But this would not give the body any
"teeth." Consequently, this proposal has been accurately criticized
for not allowing participation by members with legal or arbitral ex-
perience.160 As an alternative, it has been insightfully recommended
that a scientific advisory committee be formed to review regulations,
conduct safety training courses and disseminate information on new
genetic engineering developments. This advisory body would then
work with the inquiry group, whose members would include legal
experts. In the final analysis, however, both proposed solutions ren-
der the convention powerless. In these circumstances, arbitration
seems the only realistic means to settle disputes. This conclusion
is borne out by the almost universal adoption in contemporary
156. Cripps. supra note 6, at 16 (citing Shubber, The Role of WHO in Environmental
Pollution Control. 2 EARTH L.J. 363. 371-72 (1976)).
157. Hearings on DNA Research. supra note 99, at 425-26 (Report of the Federal
Interagency Committee on Recombinant DNA Research).
158. See Cripps, supra note 6. at 17.
159. Note, supra note 83, at 218. The suggestion draws upon the experience of
United Nations* observer groups in India and Pakistan in 1948 and in the Middle East conflict
and with respect to human rights in South Africa. Id. at 218 n.65.
160. Cripps, supra note 6. at 18.
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multilateral agreements of arbitration as the preferred form of dispute
resolution.
Liability for damages to one state (or its nationals) resulting from
genetic manipulation activities of another state (or its nationals) is a
matter of special concern. Existing theories of legal liability under
international law fail to comfort those nations and individuals worried
about the potential escape from a genetics laboratory of an Andromeda
strain or its equivalent. 161 Because of the trend toward holding parties
strictly liable 162 for damages resulting from "ultrahazardous activi-
ties ," 163 which some commentators feel includes genetic manipulation
activities, 64 strict liability principles may be applied to this
area. However, in order to achieve a consensus on a convention
regulating research, it may prove propitious to draft principles per-
taining to theories of liability as a separate convention or agreement.
Finally, as one author poignantly observes, no conventioh would
161. As has been pointed out by various commentators, the existing body of inter-
national law is not necessarily structured to handle an international recombinant DNA
hazard. No nation is to use its territory in a way which will harm the territory of another
nation. See The Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1901,
1965, 9 Ann. Dig. 315, 317, 35 AM. 1. INT'L L. 684, 716 (1941). See also Rubin, Pollution
by Analogy; The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L. REV. 259 (1971). Special liability
for environmental damage has been provided in various conventions, yet no precise parallels
exist between recombinant DNA material damage and common spoliants such as oil
spills. Nonetheless, parallels might be drawn to nuclear accidents. See Convention on Third
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, reprinted in 55 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1082 (1961) ; and Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational
Pollution, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50 (1975). See generally G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN,
A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141-47 (6th ed. 1976).
162. This principle gives cognizance to the notion of risk rather than fault. It is not
yet a codified principle of international law, but several conventions have included it as a
basis for assigning liability. Most recently, the principle has been adopted for use regarding
activities in outer space. See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762. See also
Wiewiorowska, Some Problems of State Responsibility in Outer Space Law, 7 J. SPACE L.
23 (1979); and Mossinghoff, Managing Tort Liability Risks in the Era of the Space Shuttle,
7 J. SPACE L. 121 (1979).
163. These high-risk activities merit special treatment since it would be inequitable
to require proof of fault by those injured. This inequity derives from the fact that the "risk
of serious harm" cannot be eliminated through the acting party's "exercise of the utmost
care." In return for allowing the activity to continue, the acting party assumes greater
responsibility. Note, supra note 83, at 222 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938)).
164. Note, supra note 83, at 222. See also Mays, supra note 13, at 51. Through
proper use of containment procedures (physical and biological) it is possible to substantially
minimize this high-risk of genetic engineering activities. However, if an organism did
escape and survive, few methods exist by which it could be detected and observed. There
are no "'biological geiger counters" with which one might trace its path. This fact lends
support to the "ultrahazardous" label.
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be truly complete absent a provision for some form of accident com-
pensation. 165 Thus, an international fund patterned after the Brussels
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy' 66
has been suggested. 167 The Brussels plan, which includes a compen-
sation limit, is based on the use of domestic insurance plans and
proportional contributions from member states to a special
fund. 168 However, the proposal that these contributions be based on
"the classification and measure of genetic engineering projects"' 169 is
vague. A more precise means of assigning value to the relative stakes
each state has in genetic engineering research should recognize, in
some manner, each state's research and development, number of
patents in the field, international market position 170 and past safety
record. This seems to be a more viable method of determining pro-
portional contribution levels. As the industry grows, the variables
should be re-evaluated and others included.
V. PRIVATE INDUSTRY
Fundamental to any consideration of international regulation of
genetic engineering research is an understanding of the newly emerg-
ing recombinant DNA industry. Commercialization of these scien-
tific breakthroughs has begun. Stock market analysts and industry
experts predict that the market for recombinant DNA pharmaceutical
products will be $3 billion annually by 1990.'71 Speculation in
165. Cripps, supra note 6. at 19-20.
166. Jan. 31. 1963. reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 685 (1963). This treaty is supplementary
to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. July 29.
1960. reprinted in 55 AM. J. INTL L. 1082 (1961).
167. Cripps. supra note 6. at 19-20.
168. Compensation up to $120 million per nuclear accident is provided. The domestic
insurance scheme accounts for $5 million (laboratory or factory operator's insurance). The
nation on whose property the nuclear facility is located provides $65 million in public
funds. Finally. $50 million is contributed from public funds on a proportional basis, ac-
cording to a formula reflecting each member state's gross national product and nuclear thermal
power total. See id.
169. Id. at 20.
170. Even though few patents have been issued and commercialization of genetically
engineered products is only now beginning, markets will develop swiftly in the next few
years. Thus. this criteria will be valid by the time any agreement is reached on a convention
or code.
171. Study by International Resource Development. Inc.. a Connecticut research firm.
cited in Golden. supra note 1. at 49.
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companies going public has been frenzied. 172 Investment by phar-
maceutical firms and chemical companies in specialized plants has
proceeded even though many of the hopeful products have yet to be
tested and approved. 173 Intensive lobbying by the industry and by the
individual scientists, all eager to capitalize on these new opportunities,
has reduced legislative concern over regulation of genetic engineering
research.
A. The "Big Four"
Several biotechnology firms have sprouted within the past three
years. Four mainstream companies, however, have captured the
early lead in the race to become the Xerox or Polaroid of genetic
manipulation. These four are Genetech, Cetus, Biogen and
Genex. Genetech was founded in 1976 by a former Citibank venture
capitalist, Robert Swanson, and Herbert Boyer, a biochemist at the
University of California at San Francisco. Clearly the leader in the
field, it has signed several research agreements with large pharma-
ceutical firms and already offers a variety of products. 174 In particular,
Genetech has developed a brain hormone called somatostatin, is mass-
producing human insulin, and is perfecting production of interferon,
a drug to cure many cancers. 175 As an indication of success, gross
revenues of $856,335 in 1978 rose to $3.5 million for the first half
of 1980 alone. 176 But success has not come without contro-
versy. Genetech's close relationship with the University of California
has been threatened by accusations that Genetech stole university
research results and put them to commercial use. In one such inci-
dent, Genetech eventually agreed to pay $350,000 to the University
172. Not only has Genetech benefited from the speculation, but smaller companies
have enjoyed the new investor mood. Enzo Biochem, which went public at $7 a share in
July, 1980. hit $14 by mid-August and $26 by mid-September. This took place without
any products being sold. Mays, supra note 13. at 53.
173. Eli Lilly, a mammoth pharmaceuticals firm, committed funds for a $40 million
insulin production complex before the insulin was proven effective in humans. Id. at
54. Merck and Company equipped its laboratory with an additional $23 million in improve-
ments for recombinant DNA work. Upjohn and General Electric are also gearing up. Clark.
Begley & Hager, The Miracles of Spliced Genes, NEWSWEEK. Mar. 17, 1980. at 62. 71.
174. These agreements are with companies such as Hoffman-La Roche, A.B. Dabi
and Eli Lilly.
175. See Genetic Engineers Plug Brain Genes Into Bacteria, 76 NEW SCIENTIST 333
(1977); How Genetech Made Human Insulin, 79 NEW SCIENTIST 926 (1978); Malaria Vaccine
Engineered Genetically, 89 NEW SCIENTIST 131 (1981).
176. Investors Dream of Genes, TIME. Oct. 20. 1980. at 72.
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of California. 177 Yet this did not hamper the firm's subsequent 36
million over-the-counter stock offering in the fall of 1980.
Cetus Corporation was founded in 1971 by a biochemist, a Nobel
prize-winning physicist and a physician. The largest of the "Big
Four" companies, Cetus has received much of its support from two
sources-Schering-Plough and National Distillers & Chemical Cor-
poration.178 In addition, Standard Oil of California and Indiana Stan-
dard have bought substantial shares. As of late 1979, some $30
million of the firm's $35 million institutional capital came from the
latter three firms. 179 Many of these funds go toward producing eth-
ylene oxide and ethylene glycol. 180
Biogen S.A., a research-oriented firm founded in 1978, and
based in Geneva, is the only foreign member of this group. The first
to develop bacterial interferon,' 8' this multinational firm182 is also
heavily tied to outside industrial interests. Schering-Plough paid $8
million for a 16 percent interest in Biogen in return for various ex-
clusive manufacturing and sales rights. 183 International Nickel Com-
pany, Ltd., a mammoth metals company, obtained a 23 percent in-
terest to promote the use of bacteria to leach metals from mineral
ores. 184 Biogen is also working toward cures for foot-and-mouth dis-
ease, hepatitis and malaria. 185
Operating out of Rockville, Maryland, Genex Corporation was
started by a molecular biologist, J. Leslie Glick, in 1977.186 By using
recombinant DNA techniques to manufacture enzymes and industrial
177. Id. This is one of the reasons university officials and academics are concerned
about violations of the integrity of research at academic institutions. It also becomes a matter
of economics, since schools could be precluded from capitalizing on discoveries if researchers
patent them on behalf of companies instead. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
178. Investors Dream of Genes, supra note 176, at 72 .
179. Where Genetic Engineering Will Change Industry, supra note 5, at 160.
180. Golden, supra note 1, at 51.
181. Id. at 52. Bacterial interferon was produced in 1980 after sifting through 20,000
different genetic fragments. Id.
182. Its board of directors includes individuals from the U.K., U.S., West Germany,
Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands. Incorporated in the Netherlands-Antilles in 1978,
Biogen operates from its Geneva-Swiss operating subsidiary. Despite its cross-section of
scientists and capital sources, it is still essentially a company supported through U.S. fi-
nancing. See DNA Can Build Companies, Too, FORTUNE. June 16, 1980, at 144-53.
183. Investors Dream of Genes, supra note 176, at 72.
184. Where Genetic Engineering Will Change Industry, supra note 5, at 160.
185. Investors Dream of Genes, supra note 176, at 72.
186. Golden, supra note 1, at 52.
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chemicals, the firm grew rapidly. Its estimated worth in early 1980
approached $75 million.8 7 Koppers Company invested $2 million
in Genex. Smaller commitments were made by Emerson Electric,
Monsanto and Aetna Insurance. 188 Glick has identified an existing
market of $12.4 billion annually in which bacteria could be used more
efficiently and economically to produce synthetic organic chemi-
cals. Also, subject to penetration is a group of markets such as
plastics, synthetic rubber and pesticides worth $20 billion.1 9
In addition to the activities of these four firms, various large
corporations with diversified product lines have begun developing in-
house biotechnology programs. Drug companies, energy corpora-
tions, chemical firms and agribusiness concerns have all realized the
vast untapped potential of these scientific advances.190 But the new
technology will have to be learned and incorporated gradually. Few
of these firms have experience in culturing living organisms. ' 9' Yet,
the recent trend toward protecting patents for living organisms 92 will
187. This estimation was made by Glick himself. See Clark, Begley & Hager, supra
note 173, at 70.
188. Where Genetic Engineering Will Change Industry, supra note 5, at 160.
189. Id.
190. These companies include Eli Lilly, DuPont, General Electric, Monsanto, Exxon,
Hoffman-La Roche, Upjohn, G.D. Searle, Merck, Standard Oil of California, and Lubrizol.
191. Monsanto's commercial development manager, Bernard Gruber, commented that
"[w]e're looking at this upside down .... The chemical industry has started with small
molecules [and built larger, more complex ones] ... [while] nature makes the large molecule
first and processes things down." Where Genetic Engineering Will Change Industry, supra
note 5, at 172.
192. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Ananda Chakrabarty, a micro-
biologist working for General Electric, filed a patent application in 1972 for his invention
of a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil. The invention involved the transfer of
four different plasmids to a Pseudomonas bacteria, which then had the capacity to degrade
oil. This made possible the biological control of oil spills. The issue before the Supreme
Court was "whether a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101." Id. at 305. The application survived the Court's scrutiny:
"[R]espondent's micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter. His claim
is not a hither to unknown natural phenomenon, but [is] a nonnaturally occurring manufacture
or composition of matter-a product of human ingenuity ....... id. at 309 (emphasis
added).
The decision is limited, however, for a variety of reasons. First, it did not deal with
recombinant DNA because Chakrabarty's invention essentially involved cross-breeding. Cf.
id. at 308. Second, the Court continuously reiterated that Congress must address the ethical
and philosophical questions raised by genetic engineering, perhaps even constructing a special
statute to deal with patents. See, e.g., id. at 316-18. Third, by not addressing the question
of whether progeny of man-made organisms are covered by the patent, the Court has perhaps
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stimulate more aggressive recruitment of scientists, and a far greater
willingness to commit funds to the basic research and development
of specialized facilities.193
B. National Support for Biotechnology Firms
Government support has made many of these scientific discov-
eries possible, particularly through basic research grants to university
scientists and by specialized funding for scientific foundations and
government research institutes. Although the United States has been
the leader in terms of public support-primarily for NIH activities'9' -
other nations have become increasingly active. This trend has ac-
celerated recently for two reasons. First, pressures to regulate genetic
engineering activities have been relaxed. Second, more nations have
discovered the potential contribution of genetic engineering to the
health of their respective national economies.
Private genetic engineering firms are supported less in the United
States than elsewhere. In fact, such support is virtually non-existent
in the United States. Foreign governments, on the other hand, par-
ticularly in Europe and Japan, have been actively subsidizing com-
panies involved in recombinant DNA research. Some governments
have even established their own national entities to develop and com-
mercialize genetically engineered products.
British industry has entered the industry somewhat late, even
weakened its value. Fourth, the high rate of technological change in this burgeoning field
will decrease the relative value of patents by outdating the processes being protected. Fifth,
as Chief Justice Burger noted in the majority opinion, "legislative or judicial fiat as to
patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown any more than
Canute could command the tides." Id. at 317.
Although not holding that either gene-splicing or organisms created by the process are
patentable, the Chakrabartv decision gives the proverbial green light to further scientific and
industrial efforts. See Yanchinski, Patenting Life is No Guarantee of Success, 86 NEW
SCIENTIST 373 (1980); Mays, supra note 13, at 52-54; The Right to Patent Life. NEWSWEEK,
June 30, 1980, at 74. How significant a qualitative effect this will have on the development
of genetic engineering depends, in large part, on Congress' response to the Court's challenge
for it to fashion a special patent law. Cf. Genetic Patents: Less than Meets the Eye, Bus.
WK., June 30, 1980, at 48 (stating that the Chakrabartv decision left many questions
unanswered and that their resolution has been placed in the hands of Con-
gress). Congressional inaction, thus far, would indicate guarded pro-industry sympathies.
For an elaboration on Europe's inability to fashion a solid position on the patent issue, see
What's Bugging the European Patent Office?, 81 NEW SCIENTIST 845 (1979).
193. Nelson Schneider. a vice-president at E.F. Hutton, expects private capital for
these activities to hit almost $2 billion by 1985. Genetic Patents: Less than Meets the Eye,
Bus. WK., June 30, 1980, at 48.
194. The level of NIH funding at the end of 1979, for example, was $91.5 million. A
Flood of Federal Funds for Genetic Engineering, Bus. WK., Oct. 22. 1979, at 164.
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though interferon was discovered there in 1957. British Petroleum
Company and Imperial Chemical Industries Limited have created in-
house laboratory facilities and are sponsoring recombinant DNA re-
search. The British government, after following the stringent GMAG
guidelines for many years, eventually decided it could not afford to
allow its talented scientists to work overseas for foreign firms. In
July, 1980, the National Enterprise Board (NEB) made public its
plans to establish a British biotechnology firn--Celltech. Capitalized
with $28.5 million, Celltech was to receive between 40 and 49 percent
of its initial capitalization from the NEB with the remainder coming
from four large British investment houses. 95
On the Continent, France has launched a massive program to
build a national biotechnology industry. Acting upon the assumption
that annual sales of inteferon and genetically produced human insulin
could reach $3 billion and $30 billion respectively,1 96 France set up
the Groupe Genie Genetique (known as G3)-a conglomerate of state-
run genetic research institutes, which works with the Pasteur Insti-
tute. 197 Private industrial activities include research by Socit6
Nationale Elf Aquitaine-the French national oil company-into pro-
duction of energy from cellulose, research by a multi-firm enterprise
called Transgene, 98 and extensive work with insulin production by
the Merieux Institute, a subsidiary of France's largest chemical com-
pany, Rhone-Poulenc. '99
Japanese efforts have centered around governmental support for
private genetic research activities. In early 1980, Toray Industries
and Green Cross Corporation were each awarded $4 million annually
for five years by the government's Research Development Corporation
of Japan. The goal of these grants is to produce interferon on a mass
scale. 200 Mocida Pharmaceutical Company has agreed on a joint
venture with G.D. Searle of Chicago to produce interferon 20 1 and even
Kirin Brewery has thrown its hat into the interferon ring.
195. Challenging the U.S. Lead in Biotechnology, supra note 76, at 30.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. It is comprised of Roussel Uclaf. BSN-Gervais Danone, L'Air Liquide, Met-
Hennessy and Elf. Plans were to spend $20 million in research between 1980 and 1985. Id.
199. Merieux's insulin already received U.S. Food and Drug Administration approval
for public sales. Id.
200. Id. at 31.
201. A $9 million to $14 million plant was to be built in Shizuoka by late 1981. Seven
other firms were also doing interferon research and development in Japan by 1980. Id.
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One must conclude that foreign governments, anxious not to lose
their share of what promises to be a burgeoning economic opportunity,
are still concerned about public pressures for some regulatory struc-
tures. The technological complexities of the issues alone are reason
enough for exercising caution in proceeding to formulate policy. One
means of balancing these two competing concerns is to continue
funding basic research, but not to be overly generous in granting
patents or in approving products for mass marketing and public
sales. As one observer has noted, the likely result of this juggling is
that "[t]he biotechnological contest in the U.S., Japan and Europe
may be decided as much by government policy as by corporate
initiative. "202
VI. CONCLUSION
In the past decade the world has witnessed the growth of a
phenomenal new technology. Ironically, as with so many recently
heralded discoveries, this technology simultaneously possesses the
ability to either significantly improve the quality of human life or to
eradicate the species. National efforts to regulate recombinant DNA
have aimed, thus far, at preventing the latter event from occur-
ring. Primarily patterned after the NIH and GMAG guidelines, these
regulations have been most effective when applied to publicly funded
research activities. Voluntary compliance by the private sector has
been substantial, but not complete.
Various regional and international bodies have focused their at-
tention and resources on the recombinant DNA research debate. At
present, however, most of these groups' contributions have centered
on gathering and disseminating information, conducting risk-assess-
ment experiments, and sponsoring conferences and workshops. They
have pointed out the inadequacies of current regulatory schemes and
have detailed the need for greater multilateral cooperation but have
not recommended a comprehensive set of standards for adoption.
Despite a plethora of treaties, conventions and agreements po-
tentially applicable to isolated aspects of the recombinant DNA con-
troversy, none adequately tackles the entire problem. This has caused
many observers to conclude that a separate convention or agreement
on recombinant DNA is necessary. The recent success of the OECD
High Level Meeting on Chemicals in establishing standards for chem-
ical regulation indicates that international agreement on recombinant
202. Id.
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DNA research safety is possible. Relevant issues, such as legal li-
ability for injury from recombinant DNA activities, compensation for
such injuries and dispute settlement mechanisms, may have to be left
for separate agreements in order to reach a minimal consensus on the
research safety issue.
The ultradynamic growth of the genetic engineering industry
limits these national and international intentions for regulatory con-
trol. While many nations' initial reaction to the recombinant DNA
debate in the mid- 1970's was one of extreme caution, the overwhelm-
ing potential economic and health benefits to be derived from this
nascent technology have altered their perspective. Fearful of pro-
moting an exodus of their indigenous scientists, researchers, industries
and venture capital, these countries have not only softened restrictions
and halted national legislative efforts, but they have also actively
begun subsidizing national biotechnology research. This technology
is seen by some nations as a means to revitalize national industrial
health.
Even though the pendulum has swung almost completely to the
opposite side in a decade, it is not too late to prevent catastrophic
accidents. Sufficient public concern still exists. Nations are not blind
to this fact; rather, they are somewhat stunned by the rapidity of
change in this area and by the visions of wealth seen by industrial
entrepreneurs. Consequently, nations do not share a common per-
ception of the threat of potentially disastrous recombinant DNA ac-
cidents, and meaningful international standards are not likely to be
promulgated until the world witnesses its first genetic "Three Mile
Island" incident. It seems there is no turning back, but we have been
warned.
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